A Second Cast of the Net: Shell, Chevron and the Return to Block 42

Deepwater drillship Discoverer Enterprise at sea alongside the support vessel Toisa Perseus
Deepwater drillship Discoverer Enterprise with the Toisa Perseus. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

The news in brief

Upstream reports that Shell and Chevron are preparing a fresh attempt on Block 42, offshore Suriname, “after mixed results from first well”. Shell, the operator, drilled Zanderij-1 on the block in 2022 and encountered oil. The partners at the time judged it non-commercial, yet they also read it as proof of a working petroleum system. A second well is now being prepared in order to find what the first one only hinted at: an oil leg of commercial size.

Block 42 is deepwater acreage of more than 6,000 square kilometres, in roughly 2,000 to 2,500 metres of water. It lies north of Block 58, where TotalEnergies and APA found Sapakara and Krabdagu, and from where the US$10.5 billion GranMorgu project is moving towards first oil in 2028. It was originally held in equal thirds by Shell, Hess and Chevron. Chevron has since acquired Hess, and so it arrives at this second well with considerably more at stake, and with a view of the Stabroek geology across the border.

The wider setting: a supermajor’s regret

Timing matters here. In February 2026, on Shell’s fourth-quarter earnings call, CEO Wael Sawan was asked about growth: “I wish we hadn’t walked away from Guyana when we did. That’s the honest truth.” In September, Safari Brief reported that Sawan regards the 2014 exit from Guyana as an “understatement” of how early Shell left, and framed Shell’s renewed focus on Suriname and Namibia as a deliberate second attempt at Atlantic Margin growth.

A point of precision: the regret is documented for Guyana. Shell left Stabroek in 2014, a year before Liza, and that block now holds some 33 discoveries and nearly 11 billion barrels. Suriname is not the place Shell left too early; it is the place where Shell is trying not to repeat the pattern. The distinction matters, because it turns Block 42 from an ordinary exploration well into a statement of corporate intent.

What I make of it

1. Persistence is the real asset. The geology of this basin has repeatedly punished early departures and rewarded patience. Kosmos drilled Pontoenoe-1 on this very block in 2018 and found no hydrocarbons, then sold out to Shell. Zanderij-1 improved on that: oil, albeit not enough. A first well is a question; a second well is the beginning of an answer. Hess said as much in 2023: “We think we’re in the oil window on block 42 and what we’re trying to do is to define that window.”

2. Chevron’s role has changed. With Hess inside Chevron, the company is no longer a minority partner on this block. It is a company that knows both sides of the border, and one whose Suriname footprint now includes Block 5 (Korikori-1) and the new shallow-water Blocks 9 and 10. A company that stays in the room, as it were, tends to be the one that is called back to the table.

3. Shell is rebuilding credibility, not only reserves. Sawan has spoken of partnering with host governments that trust Shell. In Suriname, trust is built the slow way: seismic, wells, local participation, and a steady hand in negotiations with Staatsolie.

4. Competition is good news for Suriname. The basin no longer depends on a single narrative. TotalEnergies and APA lead at GranMorgu; Petronas has the widest footprint; Chevron, Shell, QatarEnergy and PetroChina add depth. A broad field of operators is the best protection against dependency on any one of them.

Lessons from others

Guyana offers the most instructive lesson, in both directions. ExxonMobil persisted where Shell withdrew, and the difference was worth billions of barrels. Norway’s story is the other half of the lesson: the early dry wells of the 1960s did not prevent Ekofisk in 1969, and the state’s discipline in managing what followed is why its wealth endured. For Suriname the message is plain. Welcome persistence, but do not mortgage the future on barrels not yet found. A dry well is part of the arithmetic of exploration, and the national budget must not depend on any single result.

What Suriname should watch

  • Timing and rig: when the well will spud, and with what target, oil or gas.
  • Result quality: reservoir thickness, fluid type and connectivity, not merely a headline “discovery”.
  • Staatsolie’s position: back-in rights, local content commitments and the extension periods attached to this licence.
  • Hub logic: if Block 42 succeeds, its proximity to Block 58 invites questions of shared infrastructure, which is a matter for early and careful policy thought.
  • Fiscal discipline: Staatsolie contributed nearly US$387 million to the state treasury in 2025, about 32% of government revenue. That is meaningful, and also a reminder that expectations must follow production, not precede it.

Conclusion

A good fisherman does not judge the sea by one empty net, and a wise one learns from where the first net came up light. A second well on Block 42 will not decide Suriname’s future; GranMorgu has already done much of that. But it will tell us whether two of the world’s most experienced operators still see this basin as a place to invest patiently, and whether Suriname’s partnership model rewards that patience. In diplomacy, as in drilling, the one who stays at the table longest often learns the most. I will follow the well closely.

Rajendre Khargi | AmRaj Strategic Advisory | October 2026

Born in Suriname, serving the world.

Sources: Upstream (headline and standfirst); OilNOW, “‘I wish we hadn’t walked away from Guyana’ – Shell CEO” (11 Feb 2026); OilNOW, “Hess, Chevron and Shell looking to hit pay at Suriname well this year” (20 Mar 2023); OilNOW, Block 42 archive; De West, “Shell stuit op olie bij Zanderij-1”; Safari Brief via LinkedIn (23 Sep 2026); Staatsolie 2025 results, as summarised in the AmRaj Strategic Overview (March 2026).

RK

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Rajendre Khargi

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